

Systematic Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (DRRMC) and Crisis Management Council (CMC) in the Context of Marawi Siege and its Implication to National Security

BGEN Edwin C. Sadang, MNSA (RET) Philippine Army

Founder, Rapid Emergency Telecommunications Team of the Philippines (RETT PH)

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Email of Corresponding Author: esadang@ioneresources.net

Abstract

This study examined the systematic integration of Crisis Management Committees (CMCs) and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (DRRMCs) in the context of the Marawi Siege, focusing on their participation, operational challenges, needed strategies, and implications for national security. The study was anchored on Republic Act 10121, Executive Order 82, the National Crisis Management Core Manual, and the National Disaster Response Plan, particularly in relation to the transition from human-induced crisis management to disaster response management. It covered the beginning of the Marawi crisis up to the formation of Task Force Bangon Marawi and aimed to identify lessons learned, challenges, and best practices from national and regional actors involved in the response operations. The research used a mixed-method case study design supported by Modified Delphi Techniques. Data were gathered through substantive document analysis, face-to-face interviews, key informant interviews, focused group discussions, round table discussions, post-activity review inputs, diagnostic tests, behavioral checklists, and gathered operational records. Respondents included key players from the NDRRMC and Regional DRRMCs, focal persons of national government agencies, regional directors and chairpersons from regions 9, 10, and ARMM, response cluster lead agencies, and selected crisis and disaster response experts directly involved in the Marawi operations. Findings showed that both CMCs and DRRMCs contributed to the response operations, but their efforts were weakened by limited interoperability, unclear command relationships, overlapping functions, inadequate technical knowledge of each other's systems, and insufficient activation of prescribed response mechanisms. The study found that responders and senior decision-makers generally possessed expertise within their own agencies but lacked adequate understanding of how CMC and DRRMC structures should operate together during a crisis that escalates into disaster. The absence of a clear enabling policy and integrated operations manual contributed to fragmented coordination and operational confusion. The study concluded that CMCs and DRRMCs cannot function effectively in isolation during large-scale human-induced emergencies. It recommended the issuance of an Executive Order or Administrative Order to institutionalize CMC-DRRMC integration, the drafting of an Integrated Operations Manual, strengthened internal and external capacity-building, executive training for decision-makers, and further research on integration at national, regional, and local government levels. The study aligns mainly with SDG 16, SDG 11, and SDG 17 because it supports peace and security governance, safer and more resilient communities, and stronger institutional partnerships. Its sustainability impact lies in improving institutional, governance, policy, and community resilience by strengthening coordinated crisis and disaster response systems that protect lives and support national security.

Keywords: Crisis Management Committees, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils, Executive Order 82, Marawi Siege, National Crisis Management Core Manual, National Disaster Response Plan, National Security, Republic Act 10121, Response Operations, Systematic Integration

1. Introduction

National security is a fundamental concern of the Philippine government. Beyond the traditional view of security as a military matter, the human security perspective defines it as "the pursuit of freedom from want and freedom from fear" (UNDP, 1994). This broader view includes community, health, economic, food, political, environmental, and personal security. The Philippines' geographic location provides strategic value in the Asia-Pacific region, but it also exposes the country to recurring natural and human-induced hazards. Its surrounding oceans contribute to the development of destructive typhoons, while its location near seismic plates, trenches, and fault lines exposes it to geological disturbances. These conditions make the country highly vulnerable to large-scale disasters. The Philippines experiences an average of 20–22 typhoons annually, with several causing significant destruction, and the World Risk Index identified the country as one of the most hazard-prone countries globally (World Risk Index, 2015). In terms of terrorism impact, the country has also been identified as one of the nation's significantly affected by terrorist activities (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016).

To manage these threats, the Philippine government established two major emergency management pillars: Executive Order No. 82 (Malacañang, 2012a) and Republic Act No. 10121. Executive Order No. 82 operationalized the National Crisis Management Core Manual, which introduced a five-stage approach consisting of Predict, Prevent, Prepare, Perform, and Post-Action Assessment (Malacañang, 2012a, 2012b). RA 10121 institutionalized the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) system and shifted disaster management from a response-and-relief orientation to a comprehensive approach encompassing Prevention and Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery and Rehabilitation (Congress of the Philippines, 2010). While the country has gained substantial experience in managing natural disasters, the Marawi Siege in 2017 exposed the limitations of Executive Order No. 82 and RA 10121 as separate operational frameworks and highlighted the need for a more cohesive, integrated, and adaptable emergency management system (Congress of the Philippines, 2010).

The literature shows that crisis and disaster management in the Philippines are interdependent fields. Both seek to save lives, reduce suffering, protect affected populations, and contribute to national security. The 2017–2022 National Security Policy recognizes human security concerns, including community, health, environmental, food, political, economic, personal, and disaster security (Malacañang, 2017a). The policy emphasizes the need for collective action to enhance the well-being of Filipinos. Crisis management is defined in the National Crisis Management Core Manual as a threatening condition requiring urgent action or response (Malacañang, 2012b). According to Boin and Hart (2006), crises occur when threats overwhelm the coping capacity of a community and endanger its core values or life-sustaining systems. A crisis may begin as a minor incident, escalate into a critical incident, and eventually become an emergency requiring broader intervention (Malacañang, 2012b). Similarly, Marcel Dekker Inc. (2001) notes that crises may emerge gradually or suddenly, but their defining characteristic is the urgency of response required.

Philippine crisis management has traditionally been associated with law enforcement and defense institutions. Significant reforms in crisis management were introduced following major incidents that revealed weaknesses in coordination and response mechanisms. The National Crisis Management Core Manual institutionalized inter-agency and intra-agency collaboration to address human-induced crises, including terrorism, border incidents, peace and order concerns, public health threats, economic disruptions, energy-related emergencies, and environmental incidents. The manual presents crisis management as a cross-sectoral response to threats against human security and adopts the National Crisis Management Framework based on the five phases of Predict, Prevent, Prepare, Perform, and Post-Action and Assessment (Malacañang, 2012b).

Disaster management, on the other hand, is governed by Republic Act No. 10121. Both the National Crisis Management Core Manual (Malacañang, 2012b) and RA 10121 define disaster as a serious disruption in the functioning of a community or society that results in widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses exceeding local coping capacities (Congress of the Philippines, 2010). RA 10121 further explains that disasters arise from the interaction of hazards, vulnerabilities, and inadequate capacities to reduce risks or cope with adverse impacts (Congress of the Philippines, 2010). The literature likewise highlights the importance of the Incident Command System (ICS), Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), Response Clusters, and Incident Management Teams (IMTs) in ensuring coordinated emergency response. In the Philippine setting, the ICS serves as a common operational mechanism used in both crisis and disaster management. However, experiences during the Marawi Siege demonstrated that coordination mechanisms alone may be insufficient when command-and-control arrangements are unclear or inadequately implemented.

Globally, crisis and disaster management are often treated as closely related disciplines. Boin and Hart (2006) argue that the concepts of crisis and disaster are interconnected and frequently overlap in practice. Nevertheless, existing international literature provides limited discussion on the operational interoperability between crisis and disaster management systems. In the Philippines, legal and operational frameworks have been established through Executive Order No. 82 and Republic Act No. 10121 (Congress of the Philippines, 2010; Malacañang, 2012a), reflecting decades of institutional experience. Despite these developments, the integration between Crisis Management Committees (CMCs) and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (DRRMCs) remains insufficiently articulated.

The Marawi Siege serves as a critical case for examining the transition from crisis management to disaster response. What began as a localized security operation escalated into a prolonged armed conflict that resulted in widespread displacement, humanitarian needs, and extensive damage to communities. The scale and complexity of the situation required the simultaneous engagement of crisis management and disaster response mechanisms. Although crisis management principles prescribe response at the lowest appropriate political level, the magnitude of the emergency necessitated broader inter-agency coordination and the activation of disaster response structures.

This study is conceptually grounded on the integration of Executive Order No. 82 and RA 10121. Executive Order No. 82 provides the crisis management framework through the National Crisis Management Core Manual (Malacañang, 2012b), while RA 10121 establishes the disaster risk reduction and management framework (Congress of the Philippines, 2010).

The study assumes that CMCs and DRRMCs are not isolated entities but complementary systems that must operate collaboratively during large-scale emergencies. The Perform Phase of the National Crisis Management Core Manual (Malacañang, 2012b) serves as a critical transition point where disaster response structures may be mobilized to support or assume specific operational responsibilities. This linkage reflects the principles of emergency response preparedness, emphasizing timely and appropriate actions immediately following the onset of an emergency. The framework therefore promotes a common operational picture, harmonized contingency planning, efficient resource utilization, and coordinated decision-making.

A major gap identified in the literature is the lack of a clearly defined operational mechanism for integrating CMCs and DRRMCs. Although Executive Order No. 82 and Republic Act No. 10121 provide legal and institutional foundations for crisis and disaster management (Congress of the Philippines, 2010; Malacañang, 2012a), they do not fully explain how these structures should transition, coordinate, and function together. The Marawi Siege highlighted this gap, revealing challenges in strategic coordination, information sharing, command-and-control arrangements, and operational interoperability. These challenges underscore the need to examine the participation of national and regional CMCs and DRRMCs, identify the difficulties they encountered, and develop strategies for systematic integration. Such efforts are necessary to strengthen future emergency operations and enhance national security.

This study aligns with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 on Good Health and Well-Being by addressing the humanitarian and public health impacts of crises and disasters. It supports SDG 9 on Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure through its emphasis on emergency management systems, incident management structures, and interoperable governance mechanisms. The study contributes to SDG 11 on Sustainable Cities and Communities by focusing on displacement, recovery, rehabilitation, and community resilience. It also supports SDG 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions through its examination of terrorism-related crisis management, institutional coordination, and governance frameworks. Furthermore, it advances SDG 17 on Partnerships for the Goals by emphasizing collaboration among government agencies, private organizations, humanitarian actors, and other stakeholders.

The study contributes to institutional sustainability by strengthening the operational relationship between CMCs and DRRMCs. Improved integration can reduce fragmented responses, enhance accountability, and ensure continuity of governance during emergencies. It also supports public health sustainability through better management of displacement, evacuation centers, and humanitarian services. From a socio-economic perspective, integrated emergency management can minimize disruptions to livelihoods, housing, and essential services while facilitating faster recovery. Finally, the study contributes to policy and governance sustainability by identifying opportunities to improve existing frameworks, procedures, protocols, and coordination mechanisms. Through these contributions, the study seeks to advance a more integrated approach to crisis and disaster management that supports national security, human security, public welfare, and sustainable community recovery.

2. Material and methods

2.1 Research Design

The study used a mixed-method research design combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to examine the implementation of management from crisis leading to disaster management operations and the importance of integrating CMCs and DRRMCs from the national to regional levels. In the presentation of Creswell (2013) from University of Nebraska-Lincoln entitled “Steps in Conducting a Scholarly Mixed Methods Study”, he explains that the “mixed method is a research approach that integrates both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study” in order to answer the research questions. The study also applied Modified Delphi Techniques to describe the systematic integration of the current systems based on the assumption that key players had varying levels of appreciation and knowledge of crisis and disaster response modalities. The first and second research questions were addressed through qualitative procedures, including substantive document analysis, official references, face-to-face interviews, and results from the Post-Activity-Review for Marawi Crisis from NDRRMC representatives. The third research question used a modified quantitative survey combined with focused group discussion (FGD), profiling, and interview guide questions among national and regional state actors. The fourth research question was addressed through facilitated round table discussions (RTD) and key informant interview (KII) at the national and regional levels. The respondents’ answers were triangulated to generate a validated understanding of their knowledge, skills, participation, challenges, and proposed strategies.

2.2 Locale of the Study

The study was conducted in relation to the crisis and disaster response management operations during the Marawi Siege. The research covered Marawi City, adjacent affected areas, Iligan City, and the national and regional offices involved in response operations. The Post-Activity-Review for Marawi Siege was held from 06-08 December 2017 at the Icon Hotel in Quezon City, Philippines. Regional Offices of the OCD were also visited to conduct key informant interviews with

chairpersons of different Regional DRRMCs. The study included national and regional levels only, particularly the agencies and response structures involved in the Marawi crisis and disaster operations.

2.3 Respondents of the Study

The respondents were key players of the NDRRMC and Regional DRRMCs who participated in crisis and disaster management operations during the Marawi Siege. They included senior leaders and officers from the national and regional levels who performed actual management operations. Focal Persons of the NDRRMC, Regional Directors, and Chairpersons of DRRMCs from Regions 9, 10, and ARMM participated in the study. The respondents also included selected Response Cluster Lead Agencies, Emergency Operations Center personnel, Incident Management Team-related actors, and officials from national government agencies. These groups were composed of main Focal Persons of the National Government Agencies (NGAs) holding Salary Grades 26-30 positions and designated as Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries and Directors, whose main functions are crisis and disaster response management for human-induced.

2.4 Sample and Sampling Procedure

The key informants were selected from members of the NDRRMC and RDRRMCs who participated in crisis and disaster management in Iligan City during the Marawi Siege. The identified key informants included Undersecretary Ricardo B. Jalad, Executive Director of the NDRRMC and Civil Defense Administrator; Undersecretary Vilma Che-Che Cabrera of DSWD; Assistant Secretary Demosthenes Santillan, Civil Defense Deputy Administrator for Operations of OCD; and COLONEL RANNIE SEVILLA, one of the authors of National Crisis Management Core Manual (Malacañang, 2012b). Other respondents were Response Cluster leaders, national and regional directors, and senior officers from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of Information Communications and Technology (DICT), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Department of Education (DepEd), Department of Transportation (DOTr), Office of Civil Defense (OCD), Philippine National Police (PNP), and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Regional Chairpersons of DRRMCs from Regions 9, 10, and ARMM were also considered because of their critical participation in the crisis and disaster response management operations.

2.5 Research Instrument

The study used several instruments consistent with its mixed-method design. These included an interview schedule, FGD and RTD guides, KII guide questions, a survey questionnaire in the form of a diagnostic test, behavioral checklists, and substantive official document analysis. For the face-to-face interviews, general questionnaires were used to gather information based on the respondents' experiences. For the key informant interviews, unrestricted probing questions were used to facilitate open discussions on the participants' involvement during the Marawi crisis and disaster response management operations. The survey questionnaire was developed as a diagnostic test to identify the state of awareness of respondents and examine the divergence of an integrated CMC and DRRMC. Substantive official document analysis was also conducted using historical data, personal accounts, government agency reports, and Internet sources at the strategic and operational levels.

2.6 Data Gathering Procedure

Data were gathered from core and ancillary players of the Marawi crisis and disaster response management operations through a Post-Activity-Review. This activity was approved by Undersecretary Ricardo B Jalad, Executive Director of the NDRRMC and Civil Defense Administrator of OCD, and was supervised and managed by the Operations Service, OCD under Director Rodrigo Diapana. It was co-organized by the DReAMB, DSWD through Director Felino Castro. The researcher conducted face-to-face interviews during breakout sessions with critical personalities directly involved in crisis and disaster response management operations. FGD and RTD sessions were also organized with selected Response Cluster Lead Agencies to broaden discussions on the integration and interplay of Response Clusters, DRRM's Incident Management Teams, and EOC officers at the national and regional levels. Additional data were gathered from scholarly books, manuals, operational and implementing plans, empirical data, and interviews with Regional DRRMC chairpersons. A known expert from the former NCMC Secretariat and co-author of National Crisis Management Core Manual (Malacañang, 2012b) was also interviewed to identify the critical integration of crisis with disaster management.

2.7 Data Analysis Techniques

The study used both quantitative and qualitative data analysis. In the quantitative phase, the researcher used instruments, behavioral checklists, gathered records from the Marawi Siege, diagnostic tests, and item analysis. Numeric data were analyzed to describe the respondents, their participation, and related variables. The level of knowledge and awareness of the personalities involved in the operations was measured in relation to the laws and guidelines that supported their work. Statistical analysis was conducted by tabulating total correct and wrong answers before determining the average percentage of respondents with correct answers. In the qualitative phase, emphasis was placed on the challenges and levels of awareness of both CMC and DRRMC through face-to-face interviews, FGDs, and RTDs. These procedures validated the crisis and disaster management challenges, knowledge, and skills of the respondents through key informants. The mixed-

method approach allowed multiple perspectives and a more complete understanding of the case study by validating quantitative assessment with qualitative empirical data. The analysis led to the development of the study's summary, conclusions, and recommendations.

2.8 Methodological Framework

The study followed a linear input-process-output-outcome (IPOO) framework. The inputs included related literature, journals, legal documents, interview guides, FGD guides, and RTD guides. These inputs were processed through substantive document analysis, face-to-face interviews, RTD, KII, and Post-Activity-Review involving key players and actors of the CMC and DRRMC at the national and regional levels only. The intended output was the systematic integration of CMC and DRRMC translated into a Manual of Operations that may be mandated through an Administrative Order or Executive Order from the President or his authorized representative. The framework showed how the functional areas of CMC and DRRMC operate as an incident develops into a critical incident, crisis or emergency, and disaster. The end-state was an integrated crisis and disaster response management operations policy intended to strengthen appropriate preparedness and prompt response during large-scale and complex emergencies affecting essential dimensions of national security.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Participation of CMCs and DRRMCs in Marawi Siege Operations

3.1.1 Participation of CMCs During Crisis Response

The results showed that the CMCs took the lead in crisis management during the Marawi Siege. The CMC at the Province of Lanao del Norte handled operational responsibilities at the provincial level, while the crisis environment operated under Martial Law through Proclamation No. 216 (Malacañang, 2017b). The data also showed that CMCs were activated at the national and regional levels, but only the Regional ARMM CMC was clearly activated among the four affected regions. No Incident Management Teams were activated at the national and regional levels, as noted in KII 4 and 5. The response also involved the establishment of a Regional Coordination Center, while higher-level CMC support was requested from the provincial to national level. These findings indicate that CMCs performed important leadership functions during the crisis phase, but their participation was not fully supported by a systematic transition mechanism toward disaster response management. Although the CMCs helped initiate prompt response actions, the limited understanding of the bridging mechanisms between the National Crisis Management Core Manual and the National Disaster Response Plan resulted in unsystematic deployment of protocols and procedures. The findings suggest that crisis management structures operated, but the absence of clear integration with DRRMC mechanisms weakened command, coordination, and operational continuity.

3.1.2 Participation of DRRMCs During Disaster Response

The results showed that DRRMCs acted as support groups during the crisis phase but became lead actors in relief operations for affected populations. National and regional Response Clusters were activated, and DRRMCs contributed to humanitarian and relief services for internally displaced persons. However, respondents reported confusion regarding the interoperability and integration of CMC and DRRMC command relationships, as reflected in KII 1-10. The results also showed that other agencies operated under their respective protocols instead of functioning within the Response Cluster Approach System, while national and regional Incident Management Teams were not activated. The findings indicate that DRRMCs contributed substantially to consequence-management operations but did not fully operate according to the structure prescribed under the National Disaster Response Plan for Consequence Management for Terrorism-Related Incidents, Version 2 (NDRRMC, 2017). Under the DRRM framework, the National DRRMC should have strategically directed emergency response operations through a Regional Incident Management Team on the ground, supported by national and regional Response Clusters as resource providers and coordinated through an Emergency Operations Center. The use of a Regional Coordination Center instead of the prescribed command-and-control structure weakened the operational clarity of DRRMC participation.

3.1.3 Awareness of Legal and Operational Frameworks

The diagnostic test showed that respondents had considerable awareness of RA10121, NDRP, NCMC, and EO82. One set of results showed an even split between aware and not aware respondents, while another showed 86% awareness and 14% non-awareness. However, the interviews, focused group discussions, and round table discussions qualified these results by showing that awareness was mostly limited to knowing that the laws or documents existed. The discussion revealed that respondents had expertise in their own fields but lacked sufficient understanding of how their functions connected with other agencies and frameworks. Participants admitted that knowledge of the concept, philosophy, and operational details of the legal and planning documents was inadequate. This explains why agencies were physically present in one operational space but often worked only according to their own mandates. The finding supports the need for a single orchestrating policy or agency that can harmonize crisis and disaster response efforts legally, administratively, and professionally.

3.1.4 Alignment of Task Force Bangon Marawi with RA10121

The results showed uncertainty among respondents regarding the alignment of Task Force Bangon Marawi with RA10121. The responses indicated that 43% answered yes while 57% answered no. Interviews further showed that this uncertainty was connected to incomplete confidence about the concept of a Task Force and the detailed provisions of RA10121. This finding suggests that recovery and rehabilitation mechanisms were not clearly understood in relation to the existing DRRM law. Since RA10121 already institutionalizes recovery and rehabilitation as a thematic area, the uncertainty surrounding Task Force Bangon Marawi reflects a broader problem in policy interpretation and operational alignment. The issue strengthens the argument that emergency management structures must be harmonized to avoid confusion when crisis response, disaster response, and rehabilitation functions overlap.

3.2 Challenges Encountered by CMCs and DRRMCs

3.2.1 Challenges Experienced by CMCs

The results showed that CMCs experienced lack of operational preparedness because the incident was treated as a sudden-onset event, as discussed in KII 1-5. The crisis became more complex because it occurred under Martial Law, and responders faced unclear command relationships, limited technical experience, and lack of trained personnel. KII 1-4 also showed limited awareness of the operational mechanisms and organization of CMCs. Other challenges included the massive degree of impact, duplication of roles and responsibilities, and unclear operational approaches for responders and victims, as explained in KII 3 and 4 and during the focused group discussion. These findings indicate that the CMC structure was tested by the rapid escalation of the Marawi incident from crisis to disaster. The local government units were overwhelmed, and even national and regional command levels were affected by the speed and scale of the event. The existence of Martial Law made coordination more complicated because command relationships were not clearly integrated with humanitarian response mechanisms. The duplication of roles and unclear operational approaches contributed to delays in the delivery of humanitarian and relief services.

3.2.2 Challenges Experienced by DRRMCs

The results showed that DRRMCs experienced challenges similar to those of CMCs. These included complex crisis operations due to Martial Law, limited awareness of CMC operational mechanisms and organization, lack of experienced and technically trained personnel, unclear command relationships, duplication of roles and responsibilities, and individual implementation of response mechanisms. KII 1-10 showed that decision-makers were knowledgeable in their respective agency mandates, but KII 1-9 showed that DRRMC actors often focused only on the internal dynamics of their own groups or agencies. These findings indicate that DRRMCs had operational capacity within their respective mandates but lacked sufficient interoperability with the CMC system. The individual implementation of agency mechanisms weakened unified action and contributed to overlaps in functions. The results show that disaster response actors need not only technical competence within their own agencies but also practical knowledge of crisis management structures, especially during human-induced disasters involving security operations.

3.2.3 Shared Interoperability Challenges

The results showed that both CMC and DRRMC participants identified limited knowledge of each other's systems as a crucial factor. Respondents emphasized the absence of an enabling law or policy for integration, the lack of capacity-building for top decision-makers and key players, and the need for leaders to appreciate the value and roles of both CMC and DRRMC structures. The findings also showed concern over the recurring leadership changes in both systems and the growing occurrence of human-induced crises and disasters. The shared challenges demonstrate that the main weakness was not the absence of response actors but the absence of a systematic integration mechanism. The CMC and DRRMC systems had legal and operational foundations, but these were implemented separately. Without a clear enabling policy, regular capacity-building, and integrated exercises, responders remained vulnerable to overlapping functions, fragmented coordination, and delayed decision-making. The findings show that national security and public safety require stronger institutional integration between crisis and disaster management systems.

3.3 Strategies for Systematic Integration

3.3.1 SWOT-Based Strategic Finding

The results showed that the main strengths were the existence of respective legal documents for CMC and DRRMC, the presence of the CMC Manual and NDRP for DRRM response operations, the expertise of key players, and the wealth of individual and institutional experiences. The weaknesses were limited know-how on CMC and DRRMC interplay, absence of enabling law or strategic policy for systematic integration, lack of capacity-building for decision-makers and key players, and separate implementation of CMC and DRRMC mechanisms. The opportunities included the creation of legal documents for systematic integration, drafting of an Integrated CMC and DRRMC Operations Manual, internal capacity-building, and integrated capacity-building for decision-makers and key players. The threats included lesser appreciation and priority from top-level leaders, satisfaction with the current state of response mechanisms, recurring leadership changes, and increased occurrences of human-induced crises and disasters. These findings indicate that the foundation for integration already exists, but it remains underdeveloped. The strengths and opportunities provide the basis for addressing

the weaknesses and threats. The legal documents, manuals, plans, expert personnel, and institutional experiences can serve as anchors for a unified framework. However, without an enabling law, integrated operations manual, and continuous capacity-building, the separate implementation of CMC and DRRMC systems may continue to produce fragmented response during complex emergencies.

3.3.2 Proposed Integration Measures

The results showed that systematic integration can be pursued through a new legal or policy document, possibly through an Administrative Order or Executive Order issued by Malacañang leadership. The proposed strategy also includes the drafting of an Integrated CMC and DRRMC Operations Handbook that must be useful, used, and protected to preserve lessons and gains from previous response operations. The study further identified the need to use subject-matter experts from CMC and DRRMC operations, institutional experiences of responders, regular stakeholder engagement, and scenario-based practical exercises. The discussion shows that systematic integration requires both policy reform and operational discipline. CMCs should focus on direct crisis management requirements and the needs of responders, while DRRMCs should focus on the human security of affected populations. In the Marawi context, this means that the CMC should manage direct action inside the conflict zone, while the DRRMC should handle consequence-management concerns such as displaced populations, evacuation centers, health, food, alternate livelihood, and other humanitarian needs. This delineation can reduce duplication, clarify command relationships, and improve the delivery of services.

3.4 Implications to National Security

3.4.1 Policy and Operational Implications

The results showed that systematic integration of CMC and DRRMC has implications for the six dimensions of national security under the MNSA Program of the NDCP. The study found that an integrated system can support policy analysis, strategy development, strategic objective-setting, effective implementation, and legally authorized flexibility for corrective adjustment of existing operational concepts, frameworks, and approaches. The study also emphasized that integration can strengthen the spirit of “bayanihan” by linking crisis and disaster response actors from affected areas to national leadership. These findings indicate that CMC and DRRMC integration is not merely an administrative concern but a national security requirement. A unified system can strengthen coordination, institutionalize crisis and disaster management programs from the national to local levels, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency and disaster operations. The policy of creating an integrated system is relevant because it addresses the operational issues that arise when crisis management and disaster management overlap.

3.4.2 Human Security and Governance Implications

The results showed that ineffective and inefficient crisis and disaster response management operations may lead to protest against government, possible violence, sudden inflation, economic slowdown, fear of derivative threats such as disease spread, limited access to data, information, and knowledge, and increased human security concerns. The study therefore identified systematic integration as a way to provide practical solutions to CMC and DRRMC players and unify their separate implementation systems. These findings show that crisis and disaster response failures can extend beyond operational inconvenience and may affect governance, public trust, economic stability, health security, and community safety. The integration of CMC and DRRMC can bind social, cultural, institutional, and organizational strands into a more coherent emergency management system. In this sense, systematic integration supports national security by reducing confusion, improving coordinated action, and strengthening the government’s ability to protect the Filipino people during human-induced and natural disasters.

4. Conclusion & Recommendations

The study concludes that the Marawi Siege demonstrated the necessity of systematically integrating the Crisis Management Committees (CMCs) and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (DRRMCs) from the national to regional levels, since both organizations cannot function effectively in isolation during large-scale human-induced crises that develop into disasters. Although the CMCs and DRRMCs showed generally rational levels of performance, the response operations also revealed disorganized management, overlapping functions, limited awareness of each other’s systems, insufficient capacity-building, lack of simulation and interoperability exercises, and confusion among response units. Senior decision-makers were found to be competent within their respective fields but unfamiliar with how to integrate with the other pillar, showing that CMC responders had limited knowledge of DRRM dynamics and DRRMC responders had limited knowledge of crisis management dynamics. The findings further indicate that the absence of systematic integration from the national to regional levels affects not only operational effectiveness but also national security, because the manner in which crisis and disaster response is managed can determine whether conflict is resolved systematically or whether public suffering is intensified and prolonged.

The study recommends the issuance of an Executive Order or Administrative Order to institutionalize the systematic integration of CMC and DRRMC among member agencies based on Republic Act No. 10121 and Executive Order No. 82

(Congress of the Philippines, 2010; Malacañang, 2012a). The Office of the President should include provisions requiring career and appointed officials involved in crisis management and DRRM to complete an Executive Course on CMC and DRRMC integration before designation, while NDCP or the Development Academy of the Philippines should administer the course in partnership with crisis and disaster response experts, practitioners, academe, DSWD, NSA, and OCD. The NSA and OCD should initiate the recommendation for the EO or AO, lead integration workshops and writeshops, and guide the drafting of an Integrated Operations Manual using the CMC Manual and NDRP for DRRM response operations as references. Member NGAs should train their officers and staff in supporting mechanisms such as the Response Cluster Approach System, Incident Command System, Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination System, Information Management in Disasters, and related trainings. The study also recommends strengthened internal and external capacity-building for CMC and DRRMC member agencies, use of subject-matter experts, and further research on integration at national, regional, and LGU levels, the creation of an integrated training institution, the development of cadetship programs for crisis and disaster response practitioners, and the national security implications of crisis and disaster management.

Compliance with ethical standards

The authors declare no conflict of interest. This study complied with recognized ethical standards for human-participant research by ensuring voluntary participation with informed consent, the right to withdraw without penalty, and strict confidentiality through anonymous, secure, and aggregated data handling. Given the focus on psychological well-being, procedures were non-invasive, and safeguards were observed to minimize discomfort, with guidance to appropriate support services when needed, and required institutional permissions were secured for instrument use and access to academic records.

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